Lovable Apps Exposed Their Databases. 24,664 of them.
Crissy Field scanned 159,041 Lovable projects. 24,664 returned database records on first load with no login. It is the third time since 2025.
A Hamburg security firm called Crissy Field took 159,041 projects built with Lovable, found them through the Common Crawl web archive, and asked each one a simple question: what do you hand over to a stranger who has not logged in?
24,664 of them returned database records on the first page load. No account, no click, no interaction. The site simply sent the data because it was asked.
24,664
Sites returning Supabase records on first load, with no login.
10,560
Tables containing email addresses, across 7,403 of those sites.
3rd
Time this has been reported since March 2025. Same root cause each time.
Get the funnel right, because everyone is quoting it wrong
The number travelling on social media is 7,403, usually presented as 7,403 out of 159,041. That is wrong, and in the direction that makes it sound smaller than it is.
See Crissy Field’s method and caveats

The firm prints its own caveats directly beneath its own figures. Screenshot from Crissy Field GmbH’s research report (1).
What came out of those tables, in the firm's own description: more than 1,000 records with identity document details including passport numbers, all at a single service provider. More than 200,000 chat messages. A lifestyle forum with over 80,000 profiles. Tens of thousands of contracts. Ticket and restaurant records carrying payment information, with no count attached. In one case, a system that had sent 280,000 emails.
The firm is careful in a way the reshares are not. It says plainly that the 30% rate is not a confirmed leak rate, that the sample is not representative, that some of those email addresses are public contact details or test data, and that it could not establish whether anything had been misused. Keep those caveats. They are what makes the 24,664 credible.
The default did this, and it changed three days before the story broke
This is the part nobody reselling the headline has mentioned, and it is the only part that tells you what to do.
These apps talk to their database directly from the browser, using a public API key. That key being public is by design and is not a leak; it is in the source of every page. What stops a stranger reading the whole table is the access rules on the table itself. And until recently, a new table in Supabase was exposed through the data API automatically, with no explicit grant required.
Supabase changed that. New tables are no longer auto-exposed, a change logged in April 2026 and enforced across all existing projects on 30 October 2026. The research window ran from December 2025 to September 2026, which sits entirely inside the old permissive behaviour. The report landed three days after the enforcement date.
So the honest account is neither "Lovable is insecure" nor "those builders were careless." A platform default was permissive, tens of thousands of apps were generated on top of it, the default has since been tightened for new tables, and existing tables keep the grants they already had. Which means the apps found in this research stay open until each operator goes and closes them, one at a time.
Third time, same answer
The reason to take this seriously is not the size of the number. It is that this is the third public instance of the same failure in twenty months.
Lovable's position has been consistent and it is not unreasonable: the platform ships a free security scan before you publish, acting on it is the builder's choice, and misconfigured access rules show up in hand-written software too. All of that is true. It is also not a plan, because the people generating these apps are by design the people least equipped to audit a database grant.
The same company's story a year ago was going from 11 internal apps to 80, which is the genuine upside of this and the reason nobody should read this post as an argument against building that way. The lesson is narrower. When generation gets cheap, the thing that does not scale with it is review.
What to do before Friday
Query your own app the way a stranger would. Open it in a private window, find the API call the page makes on load, and run it with no session. If it returns rows, you have the same problem these 24,664 have. This takes ten minutes and it is the only test that counts.
List your tables and read their grants, not your policies. A policy describes intent. A grant describes what the API will actually serve. The April change only protects tables created after it, so anything older carries whatever it was given on the day it was made.
Treat "the platform has a scanner" as a smoke alarm, not a sprinkler. It tells you something; it does not fix anything. If the people shipping your internal tools cannot read its output, somebody who can has to be in the loop before publish, not after a researcher calls.
Count what is reachable, not what is sensitive. This is the same mistake as the supermarket refrigeration panels sitting on the public internet. Nobody decided to expose them. Each one was connected for a good reason and never revisited, and the inventory is what nobody had.
Twenty-four thousand apps are answering questions nobody is authorised to ask. Almost none of their owners know, because nobody ever asked.
Query your own app.

