---
title: "Lovable Went From 11 Internal Apps to 80"
url: https://nativefirst.ai/blog/lovable-11-to-80-internal-apps/
description: "Anton Osika published a four-month curve for internal software built by non-engineers. The heaviest builder was not engineering or product. It was HR."
author: John Tan
category: "AI & Work"
published: 2026-09-22
updated: 2026-09-22
publisher: nativefirst.ai
format: Markdown copy of the web page at the url above, same text.
---

# Lovable Went From 11 Internal Apps to 80. HR built 30 of them.

Anton Osika published a four-month curve for internal software built by non-engineers. The heaviest builder was not engineering or product. It was HR.

John Tan · September 17, 2026 · 5 min read

On September 17, Anton Osika posted a number about his own company that is worth more than most adoption surveys.

> "Every department at Lovable now builds its own software. In April we had 11 internal apps our own teams had built on Lovable, by August it was more than 80. Lovable has a real internal software ecosystem now. The People team alone has built about 30 apps."
>
> **Anton Osika** · X · September 17, 2026

Eleven to eighty in four months is the headline. The last sentence is the part that should stop you, because it answers a question most AI plans never ask: **who actually builds the software?**

**Org planning · Sep 17** Built by Lovable’s People team on Lovable. Headcount requests route for approval, and only then write back to HiBob.

One of the 80. Screenshot shared by Anton Osika on X ([1](https://x.com/antonosika/status/2100506342545101109)).

**Figure 1. Lovable internal apps, April to August 2026 · HR alone out-built the whole company**

*Chart: Two bars comparing Lovable's internal app count. April 2026 shows 11 apps as a short bar. August 2026 shows more than 80 apps as a tall bar, split into a highlighted lower segment of about 30 apps built by the People team and an upper segment for every other department. A dashed line drawn across at April's total of 11 passes through the middle of the People team segment, showing HR alone built roughly three times what the entire company had four months earlier.*

Not engineering. Not product. The team that owns hiring and onboarding shipped roughly three times what the entire company had four months earlier.

## Why the department matters more than the number

Eighty internal apps is a growth number, and growth numbers are easy to wave away. The distribution is what changes how you plan.

The model most companies are running is hub and spoke. A central AI function builds things for other departments, demonstrates value, gets asked for more, and becomes the queue everything waits in. It works, and it has a hard ceiling: **the central team's headcount.** Every request is rationed against every other request, which means the work that gets done is the work with the loudest sponsor rather than the work with the best return.

Lovable's number describes what happens after that ceiling is removed. The function stopped being the builder and became the enabler. Rails, permissions, a platform, and the departments ship for themselves.

**Figure 2. Two operating models · The ceiling moves, or it does not**

*Chart: Two diagrams. On the left, hub and spoke: a central AI team node with five department nodes around it, arrows pointing outward from the centre, meaning the central team builds everything. Its ceiling is the central team's headcount. On the right, rails: a horizontal platform bar of access, permissions and review at the base, with five department boxes above it each building for themselves. Its ceiling is the number of departments that have a problem worth solving.*

Same central team, opposite job. In the first it is a build shop. In the second it owns what agents can touch and who signs off.

Ramp reached the same conclusion from a different direction. Cristina Cordova's description of how their agent work is governed: *"a central team defines what agents can access and do, so functional teams can build their own automations safely on the same rails."* Two companies, two stacks, one shape.

It is worth noticing what the central team's job becomes, because it is not smaller. Defining what agents can access, what they can change, who reviews what, and what happens when something breaks is harder than building the apps was. It is just leveraged differently. See [Stop Hiring a Head of AI](https://nativefirst.ai/blog/stop-hiring-head-of-ai/).

## Why it was HR and not engineering

The counterintuitive part is the distribution, and the explanation is not that People teams are secretly technical.

It is that **they had the longest untouched backlog.** Engineering has always been able to build things for itself. Finance has a budget and buys software. The People function sits on a pile of processes that are too specific to buy, too small to justify a ticket, and too repetitive to keep doing by hand: onboarding checklists, interview scheduling, reference collection, policy lookups, equipment tracking, review cycles. Every one of those was a candidate for twenty years and none of them were ever worth a procurement cycle.

When the cost of an internal tool collapses to an afternoon, the department with the most unserved demand builds the most. That is the whole mechanism, and it predicts which team in your company will produce the number.

## What actually gets replaced

Lovable's customer stories give the shape, and it is mostly not new software. It is software they were already renting.

eXp Realty reports saving over $2M a year by cancelling SaaS contracts, with 85% fewer support tickets. Scion Group retired more than $1M of contracts after building 100+ apps in under four months. Nursa retired 10 SaaS systems with 200+ employees building.

Those are the vendor's own customer stories and should be read as such. But the pattern is consistent and it is not "we built exciting new products." It is **the long tail of departmental software that was never worth a procurement cycle and is now worth an afternoon**, plus the seat licences that tail was being served by.

## The surface question, answered by the person selling the surface

The obvious next thought is that if departments can generate apps, the app itself is on the way out and everything becomes a conversation with an agent. Osika, who has every commercial reason to say exactly that, says the opposite:

*"For most actions, the app is the best interface because it's visual. For things like 'just do this,' tagging an agent is sometimes faster. I tag @Lovable in Slack to do things for me."*

**Two surfaces, split by verb.** A visual app for work you look at and manipulate, an agent tag for imperative one-offs. That is the honest version of agent parity: the agent has to be able to do everything, but it should not be where you do everything. See [What Is an Agent Operating System?](https://nativefirst.ai/blog/what-is-an-agent-operating-system/)

**The app · Sep 2** Asked in Slack to build an app to track user feedback, Lovable ships a dashboard you look at.

**The tag · Sep 2**“Who are we missing feedback from?” gets a list in the thread, then an offer to prepare the outreach.

Both surfaces in one clip. Frames from Lovable’s Slack launch video on X ([1](https://x.com/Lovable/status/2095180014257930633)).

## What to take, and what to leave

**Take the shape.** If your AI function is still the team that builds things for other teams, this is what the alternative looks like with dates attached: four months, one platform decision, and the department with the least technical staff as the heaviest user.

**Take the diagnostic.** Ask each function what they would automate this quarter if they did not have to file a ticket for it. The combined length of those lists is the size of the opportunity, and the People team usually has the longest one because nobody has ever built them anything.

**Leave the target.** Eighty is not a goal. This is the CEO of the tool reporting on his own staff's use of the tool, which is the most favourable environment that exists, and the metric is a count of apps *built* rather than apps *used*. Lovable's own north-star measure is daily active apps, and that number is not in this post. Eighty internal apps could as easily be eighty abandoned ones.

What survives the caveats is the direction, and the direction is the thing worth planning against. **When the cost of internal software collapses, the builder is whoever has the problem.**

[John Tan ↗](https://www.linkedin.com/in/johntans/)

Founder of nativefirst.ai. Runs everything on agents and writes down what works.

Sources

1 Anton Osika (CEO, Lovable) on X, 2026-09-17: "Every department at @Lovable now builds its own software. In April we had 11 internal apps our own teams had built on Lovable, by August it was more than 80... The People team alone has built about 30 apps." First-party, reporting on his own company's use of his own product. [x.com](https://x.com/antonosika/status/2100506342545101109)

2 Osika on the two-surface split, September 2026: "For most actions, the app is the best interface because it's visual. For things like 'just do this,' tagging an agent is sometimes faster. I tag @Lovable in Slack to do things for me." [x.com](https://x.com/antonosika/status/2095181668789449153)

3 Lovable customer figures as published by Lovable: eXp Realty $2M+/yr in cancelled SaaS with 85% fewer support tickets; Scion Group $1M+ retired with 100+ apps in under four months; Nursa 10 SaaS systems retired with 200+ employees building. Vendor-published customer stories.

4 Cristina Cordova (Ramp) on agent governance: "A central team defines what agents can access and do, so functional teams can build their own automations safely on the same rails." [linear.app](https://linear.app/customers/ramp) · [x.com](https://x.com/cjc/status/2094466240748433442)

5 The per-department breakdown beyond the People team is truncated in the source. App count is not a usage measure, and it is not Lovable's own north-star metric of daily active apps.
